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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to an order of the
Utah Supreme Court transferring jurisdiction under the authority of Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(4) (2006).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Plaintiffs/Appellants Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises, LC and White Investment Co.,
Inc. (collectively, "Appellants") own the Canyon Rim Shopping Center (the "Shopping
Center") located at approximately 3300 East 3300 South in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Defendant/Appellant Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers of New York, Inc. ("Wendy's")
owns and operates a restaurant on a parcel within the Shopping Center (the "Wendy's
Property"). This case concerns the location of a drive-through lane and related facilities (the
"Drive-Through Facilities") associated with the Wendy's Property.
Course of Proceedings
This action was originally filed by Metropolitan Square Associates ("Metropolitan
Square") on July 30, 2004. [R. at 1.] Metropolitan Square's Complaint alleged that the
Drive-Through Facilities constituted a trespass with respect to the Shopping Center and a
breach of contract with respect to the Declaration of Restrictions and Grant of Easements (the
"Declaration") governing the Shopping Center. [R. at 2-4.] Metropolitan Square sought an
order requiring Wendy's to remove the Drive-Through Facilities and unspecified monetary
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damages. [R. at 4.] In its Answer, Wendy's denied Metropolitan Square's allegations.
Wendy's also and asserted counterclaims for: (1) a declaratory judgment to the effect that
Wendy's is entitled to maintain the Drive-Through Facilities in their present location; (2)
recognition of a prescriptive easement in Wendy's favor pursuant to which Wendy's is
entitled to maintain and use the Drive-Through Facilities in their present location; and (3) an
injunction barring Metropolitan Square from interfering with Wendy's' right to use and
maintain the Drive-Through Facilities. [R. at 15-60.]
Following some discovery, Metropolitan Square filed an Amended Complaint, which
substituted Appellants as plaintiffs and alleged that Wendy's' menu-board signs (the "MenuBoard Signs") also constitute a breach of the Declaration. [R. at 78-87, 102-03.]
Wendy's filed a motion for summary judgment on September 30, 2005. [R. at 11416.] After full briefing and oral argument, the trial court entered a Minute Entry on
December 12,2005 granting Wendy's' motion. [R. at 307-10.] The trial court subsequently
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Final Judgment dismissing all of
Appellant's Amended Complaint and all causes of action asserted therein. [R. at 375-83;
3 84-87.] The trial court's Final Judgment stated that the Drive-Through Facilities and MenuBoard Signs are permitted by the Declaration and may remain in place, enjoined Appellants
from interfering with Wendy's use and maintenance of the Drive-Through Facilities and
Menu-Board Signs, and awarded Wendy's its costs and attorneys' fees in the amount of
$19,516.50. [R. at 384-87.] This appeal followed. [R. at 397-99.]
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Statement of Facts
The Wendy's Property is located within the Shopping Center owned by Appellants.
[R. at 376.] Both the Wendy's Property and the Shopping Center are included in the property
described in the Declaration, recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's office on
September 24, 1982 as entry No. 3714292, in Book 5410, at Page 823. [R. at 376.] The
Declaration identifies three distinct parcels of property within the property described therein.
[R. at 376.] The Wendy's Property is located within what the Declaration refers to as "Parcel
Three." [R. at 376.] Plaintiff/Appellant White Investment, Inc. owns parcels one and two,
and American Stores Properties, Inc. ("ASPI") leases Parcel One from White Investment,
Inc. [R. at 30-32.]
The Wendy's property was developed as a Burger King restaurant by The Boyer
Company in or about 1982. [R. at 376.] At that time, a drive-through lane was constructed
on the north side of the Wendy's Property. [R. at 377.] The drive-through lane is bounded
on the north by a narrow, landscaped island edged with concrete curbing, and on the south
by the restaurant (the drive-through lane and related island are referred to herein as the
"Drive-Through Facilities"). [R. at 377.] The Drive-Through Facilities extend from the
northwest corner of the restaurant located on the Wendy's Property to the northeast onto what
is defined by the Declaration as the "Common Area." [R. at 377.] The Plot Plan shows the
Drive-Through Facilities as two curved lines running from the northwest corner of the
restaurant located on the Wendy's Property to the northeast. [R. at 377.] Although the Plot
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Plan does not purport to be a survey, the physical relationship between the restaurant building
and drive-through lane as shown on the Plot Plan is generally consistent in scale with the
actual location of the restaurant located on the Wendy's Property and the Drive-Through
Facilities. [R. at 120; Brief of the Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 6 (noting alleged differences of
a few feet between the actual location of the restaurant and the restaurant as shown on the
Plot Plan).] From the time they were constructed in or about 1982 through the present, the
Drive-Through Facilities have remained in continuous use in the same location and
configuration. [R. at 378.]
In addition to a pylon sign along 3300 South at the south end of the Wendy's Property,
and an arrow sign located on the Drive-Through Facilities, Wendy's also maintains two
additional menu-board signs on the Wendy's Property (referred to herein as the "Menu-Board
Signs"). [R. at 378.] Menu-board signs have existed on the Wendy's Property continuously
since 1982. [R. at 378.] The Menu-Board Signs are approximately the same size as those
that have existed on the Wendy's Property since 1982. [R. at 122.] The Menu-Board Signs
are in approximately the same location as those that have existed on the Wendy's Property
since 1982. [R. at 123.] The Menu-Board Signs are configured in approximately the same
way as those that have existed on the Wendy's Property since 1982. [R. at 123.] The MenuBoard Signs have approximately the same appearance as those that have existed on the
Wendy's Property since 1982. [R. at 123.] Menu-board signs like the Menu-Board Signs
are essential to the operation of drive-through restaurants. [R. at 378.]
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With respect to Parcel Three, the Declaration provides that
No building featuring drive-in, drive-up or drive-through traffic shall be
located on Parcel Three, except as shown on the Plot Plan, without the prior
written consent of the Owner of Parcel Two and ASPI, including consent to
the location of the drive-in, drive-up or drive-through lanes of such facility.
Such consent will not be unreasonably withheld provided that the location of
such lanes and the use thereof do not impede or inhibit access to and from the
conduct of business from the buildings in the Shopping Center or access to and
from the adjacent streets.
[R. at 38.] With respect to "Common Area," the Declaration provides in relevant part as
follows:
Common Area shall be used only for vehicular access, circulation and parking,
pedestrian traffic and the comfort and convenience of the Owners (i.e., the
owners of the property to which the Declaration pertains), tenants, customers,
invitees, licensees, agents and employees of the Owners and business
occupants of the buildings constructed in the Shopping Center (i.e., the owners
of the property to which the Declaration pertains), and for the servicing and
supplying of such businesses, except as otherwise provided herein . . . . No
building, barricade or structure may be placed, erected or constructed within
the Common Area on any parcel except loading and delivery docks and
covered areas attached to such docks, trash enclosures, outside storage areas
. . . pylon (to the extent not herein prohibited) and directional signs, bumper
guards or curbs, paving, landscaping and landscape planters, lighting
standards, driveways, sidewalks, walkways, parking stalls, columns or pillars
supporting roof overhangs, and any other improvements as may be required
under applicable laws, rules, ordinances and regulations of any governmental
body having jurisdiction over the Shopping Center . . . . The parking and
vehicular traffic patterns for the areas of the Shopping Center which are
designated "Common Area Only" on the Plot Plan [attached to the Declaration
as Exhibit "A"] shall be designed, installed and maintained as shown on the
Plot Plan.
[R. at 32-33; 377-78.] Relatedly, with respect to passage over the Common Area, the
Declaration states that
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Each Owner, as grantor with respect to each parcel owned by such Owner,
hereby grants to each of the other Owners, as grantees, for the benefit of each
of such other Owners and their respective tenants, employees, agents,
customers and invitees of such tenants, and for the benefit of each parcel
owned by such grantee, a non-exclusive easement appurtenant to each parcel
owned by each grantee for ingress and egress by vehicular and pedestrian
traffic and for vehicular parking upon, over and across the Common Area
within each parcel or parcels owned by the grantor.
[R. at 34-35.]
The Declaration also establishes maintenance obligations in and about the Common
Area:
Each owner, at its own expense, shall maintain the area designated as Common
Area Only on the Plot Plan and located on its parcel at all times in good and
clean condition and repair, which maintenance shall include, but not be limited
to the following:
(b)

(c)

Removing all papers, debris, filth, refuse, snow, ice and water and
thoroughly sweeping the area to the extent reasonably necessary to keep
the area in a clean and orderly condition;
Placing, keeping in repair, and replacing any necessary appropriate
directional signs, markers and lines; . . . .

[R. at 36-37.]
With respect to signage on Parcel Three, the Declaration states that
The Owner of Parcel Three shall have the right to construct two (2) freestanding pylon, monument or other signs at the location designated on the Plot
Plan as "Parcel Three Sign." No other pylon, monument or other free-standing
sign shall be permitted on Parcel Three without the prior written approval of
all Owners . . . .
[R. at 39-40; 378.]
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The Declaration provides that in the event legal proceedings are brought to enforce
any provision of the Declaration as against any party with an interest in the property
described therein, the successful party in the action shall be entitled to recover "a reasonable
sum as attorneys' fees and costs" from the other party. [R. at 378-79.]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court correctly interpreted the Declaration to expressly permit Wendy's5
maintenance and use of the Drive-Through Facilities and Menu-Board Signs in their current
configuration and location. The Declaration expressly permits drive-through restaurants as
shown on the Plot Plan sketch. Although not drawn to scale, the Plot Plan depicts the DriveThrough Facilities in their present location. Even if the Declaration did not expressly permit
the Drive-Through Facilities, Appellants could consent to their location. Appellants'
acquiescence to the location and maintenance of the Drive-Through Facilities for more than
two decades amounts to consent. In any event, it would be unreasonable for Appellants to
withhold their consent to the Drive-Through Facilities and, according to the Declaration, they
may not do so.
While the Declaration prohibits certain types of signage, "directional" signs are
expressly permitted on the Wendy's Property. Unlike the forbidden billboard-type signs, the
Menu-Board Signs are directional inasmuch as they direct traffic and instruct customers on
the procedure for placing orders. Even if not considered directional signs, the Menu-Board
Signs are nonetheless implicitly permitted by the Declaration. Indeed, the Declaration
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provides for the operation of a drive-through restaurant on the Wendy's Property, and menuboard signs are a normal and necessary incident of such restaurants. Interpreting the
Declaration to allow a drive-through restaurant, but at the same time to forbid the necessary
signage would be an error.
The Court need not address Appellants' argument that the Drive-Through Facilities
constitute a continuing trespass for purposes of the relevant statutes of limitation because
Wendy's' maintenance and use of the Drive-Through Facilities are expressly permitted by
the Declaration. Even if the Drive-Through Facilities could be considered a trespass,
however, they are permanent in nature and the statute of limitation expired almost two
decades ago. Given that the Drive-Through Facilities are expressly permitted by the
Declaration, the trial court correctly enjoined Appellants from interfering with or removing
them.
The trial court's award of attorneys' fees and costs in Wendy's' favor should be
affirmed because Appellants' argument that they are not a "defaulting Owner or party"
against whom an award can be made is raised for the first time on appeal. In any event,
Appellants' assertion of baseless, untimely claims against Wendy's was a breach of the
Declaration entitling Wendy's to an award of attorneys' fees and costs. Moreover, each
claim with respect to which the trial court entered an award of attorneys' fees and costs was
based on the Declaration and, therefore, compensable. There was consequently no need for
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Wendy's to allocate its attorneys' fees and costs between compensable and non-compensable
claims as Appellants contend.
ARGUMENT
The Declaration is a contract like any other, and consequently, the interpretation of
the Declaration is a question of law. See Alpha Partners, Inc. v. Transamerica Investment
Management, LLC,

2006 UT App 331, T( 14,

P.3d

. The trial court correctly

interpreted the Declaration to expressly permit Wendy's' maintenance and use of the DriveThrough Facilities and Menu-Board Signs in their current configuration and location. Based
on its proper interpretation of the Declaration, the trial court also correctly ruled that
Appellants may not interfere with or remove the Drive-Through Facilities or the Menu-Board
Signs. This Court should, therefore, affirm the trial court's Final Judgment.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE
DECLARATION TO PERMIT THE DRIVE-THROUGH FACILITIES

The trial court correctly concluded that "[although the Declaration generally forbids
the construction of improvements on common areas [of the Shopping Center], it expressly
authorizes Drive Through Facilities located on Parcel Three as shown on the Plot Plan." [R.
at 380.] The trial court's decision has ample support in the record, was correct as a matter
of law, and should be affirmed.
A.

The Declaration Expressly Permits the Drive-Through Facilities.

With respect to drive-through facilities generally, the Declaration provides in relevant
part that "[n]o building featuring drive-in, drive-up or drive-through traffic shall be located
191462vl - M I B
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on Parcel Three, except as shown on the Plot Plan .. . ." [R. at 38; 377.] Thus, so long as
the Plot Plan shows a "building featuring . . . drive-through traffic" on Parcel Three, the
Declaration expressly authorizes such facilities. This conclusion is supported by the fact that
the Declaration clearly contemplates, and again, expressly permits, improvements such as the
Drive-Through Facilities:
No building, barricade or structure may be placed, erected or constructed
within the Common Area on any parcel except. . . directional signs, bumper
guards or curbs, paving, landscaping and landscape planters, lighting
standards, driveways . . . as may be required under applicable laws, rules,
ordinances and regulations of any governmental body having jurisdiction over
the Shopping Center . . . . The parking and vehicular traffic patterns for the
areas of the Shopping Center which are designated "Common Area Only" on
the Plot Plan shall be designed, installed and maintained as shown on the Plot
Plan.
[R. at 33.]
The Plot Plan attached to the Declaration does indeed show a building featuring a
drive-through lane on Parcel Three. [R. at 52.] Parcel Three is located in the lower right
area of the Plot Plan. [R. at 52.] The Wendy's Property appears in the lower left area of
Parcel Three as a rectangle. [R. at 52.] The Plot Plan shows the Drive-Through Facilities
as two curved lines running from the northwest comer of the rectangle to the northeast onto
the Common Area of the Shopping Center. [R. at 52.] Appellants do not dispute that the
Drive-Through Facilities are physically located in the general location shown on the Plot
Plan.

[See Brief of the Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 16 (quoting expert, Mark Babbitt).]

Moreover, the trial court found that u[t]he Drive Through Facilities extend from the
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northwest comer of the restaurant located on the Wendy's Property to the northeast onto what
is defined by the Declaration as the 'Common Area' of the Shopping Center." [R. at 377.]
Consequently, the Declaration does expressly permit the Drive-Through Facilities.
Appellants contend that because the actual physical location of the Drive-Through
Facilities differs by a few feet from the location shown on the Plot Plan, the Drive-Through
Facilities are not permitted by the Declaration. [See Brief of the Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 14.]
Appellants' argument fails to account for the fact that the Plot Plan is neither an "as
constructed" drawing nor a precise survey of the Shopping Center. The Plot Plan itself is
labeled a "Proposed Site Plan." [R. at 52.] Appellants' expert, Mark Babbitt, so testified and
added his opinion that the Plot Plan "is indicative of a preliminary layout, not as a
constructed drawing or a survey." [R. at 280.] Mr. Babbitt's opinion is bolstered by the fact
that the Plot Plan is clearly not drawn to scale, includes no dimensions, and purports to be
nothing more than a sketch of the Shopping Center. [R. at 52.] Given that the Plot Plan was
obviously not intended to be an exact diagram of the Shopping Center, it is hardly surprising
that the precise location of the Wendy's Property and the Drive-Through Facilities differs
slightly from the location shown on the Plot Plan.1
Since some variability between a not-to-scale sketch and reality is to be expected, the
drafters of the Declaration must have anticipated and intended to permit drive-through

inasmuch as the Plot Plan does not purport to be drawn to scale and includes no
dimensions, Mr. Babbitt's comparison of the Plot Plan and reality cannot possibly be as
precise as the measurements he claims to have made would suggest.
191462vl -MJB
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facilities in the general location shown on the Plot Plan without regard to precise
measurements. Had the drafters genuinely been concerned about the exact location of drivethrough facilities, they would surely have attached a considerably more detailed survey or
map to the Declaration than the Plot Plan. As it is undisputed and indisputable that the Plot
Plan shows the Drive-Through Facilities extending from the northwest corner of the Wendy's
Property to the northeast and onto the Common Area, and the Drive-Through Facilities are,
in fact, so located, the Declaration expressly provides for such Drive-Through Facilities in
their present location. Again, that there may be some slight variation between the Plot Plan
and reality is to be expected and in any event is so small as to be immaterial. The trial court's
decision to grant Wendy's' motion for summary judgment was, therefore, correct and should
be affirmed.
B.

Appellants Consented to the Location of the Drive-Through
Facilities-

Even if the Drive-Through Facilities were not expressly permitted by the Declaration,
Appellants have consented to their location. Although the trial court did not consider the
question of Appellants' consent, "it is well established that an appellate court may affirm the
judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the
record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the
basis of its ruling or action." First Equity Fed., Inc. v. Phillips Dev.} LC, 2002 UT 56, \ 11,
52 P.3d 1137 (citations omitted). u[T]his is true even though such ground or theory is not
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urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not
considered or passed on by the lower court." Id.
According to the Declaration, except as shown on the Plot Plan, drive-through
facilities may not be located on Parcel Three
without the prior written consent of the Owner of Parcel Two and ASPI,
including consent to the location of the drive-in, drive-up or drive-through
lanes of such facility. Such consent will not be unreasonably withheld
provided that the location of such lanes and the use thereof do not impede or
inhibit access to and from the conduct of business from the buildings in the
Shopping Center or access to and from the adjacent streets.
[R. at 38.] While there is nothing in the record to suggest that Appellants ever gave written
consent to the location of the Drive-Through Facilities, there can be no dispute that
Appellants gave actual consent. Specifically, the trial court found that the Drive-Through
Facilities have existed in their present location and configuration since 1982. [R. at 378.]
Appellants subsequently waited more than 20 years, until 2004, to take exception to the
location of the Drive-Through Facilities by commencing this action. [R. at 1 -5.] Appellants
long period of silence and acquiescence can only be interpreted to be the functional
equivalent of, and amount to, express consent. Having consented to the location of the
Drive-Through Facilities for so long, Appellants are not, as the trial court concluded, entitled
to an order requiring their removal. [R. at 380.]
The trial court's Final Judgment should be affirmed for a similar reason even were
Appellants not deemed to have consented to the location of the Drive-Through Facilities.
This is so because, according to the Declaration, Appellants' "consent [to the Drive-Through
191462vl -MJB
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Facilities] will not be unreasonably withheld provided that the location of such lanes and the
use thereof do not impede or inhibit access to and from the conduct of business from the
buildings in the Shopping Center or access to and from the adjacent streets." [R. at 38.] In
the absence of evidence that the Drive-Through Facilities have "impede[d] or inhibited]"
access to anything for over 20 years, Appellants could not reasonably withhold their consent
to the Drive-Through Facilities as presently constituted. Thus, according to the Declaration,
Appellants' are required to consent to the Drive-Through Facilities despite their recently
raised objections.
In sum, the trial court correctly interpreted the Declaration to expressly authorize the
construction and maintenance of the Drive-Through Facilities in their present location and
configuration. Even if the Declaration were not so construed, Appellants have consented to
the location of the Drive-Through Facilities through more than two decades of acquiescence.
Finally, since the Drive-Through Facilities do not "impede or inhibit" access to the Shopping
Center, Appellants cannot withhold their consent to the Drive-Through Facilities and they
are not entitled to remove them. The trial court's Final Judgment should be affirmed for all
of these reasons.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED
DECLARATION TO PERMIT THE MENU-BOARD SIGNS

THE

Like the Drive-Through Facilities themselves, menu-board signs have existed on the
Wendy's Property as a normal and necessary incident of a drive-through restaurant for many
years. [R. at 378.] Also like the Drive-Through Facilities, the Menu-Board Signs are
191462vl -MJB
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expressly permitted by the Declaration, and the trial court was correct to so hold. The trial
court's approval of the Menu-Board Signs has two bases. First, the trial court correctly held
that, while the Declaration forbids certain types of signage, it does not forbid menu-board
signs. [R. at 380,] Second, the trial court concluded that menu-board signs are "an
inherently necessary feature of modern drive through restaurants" and inasmuch as the
Declaration expressly permits the operation of a drive-through restaurant on Parcel Three,
the Declaration necessarily permits the Menu-Board Signs. [R. at 381.] Both of the trial
court's conclusions were correct.
A.

The Declaration Expressly Permits the Menu-Board Signs*

Appellants contend that the Declaration forbids the construction and maintenance of
any more than two "pylon, monument or other free-standing sign[s]" on Parcel Three, where
the Wendy's Property is located. [See Brief of the Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 18.] This
contention is based on a single section of the Declaration, which states that
The Owner of Parcel Three shall have the right to construct two (2) freestanding pylon, monument or other signs at the location designated on the Plot
Plan as "Parcel Three Sign." No other pylon, monument or other free-standing
sign shall be permitted on Parcel Three without the prior written approval of
all Owners . . . .
[R. at 39-40; 378.] Since it is undisputed that two "pylon, monument or other free-standing
sign[s]" other than the Menu-Board Signs exist on Parcel Three, Appellants' believe that the
Declaration forbids the Menu-Board Signs. [R. at 18-20.]
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Preliminarily, the above-quoted provision of the Declaration only forbids "pylon,
monument or other free-standing sign[s]," the types of primary signs identifying a business.
The Declaration does not forbid other types of signs, and, in fact, the Declaration expressly
permits an unlimited number of "directional signs." [R. at 33.] Although Appellants pay lip
service to the Court's duty to consider each provision of the Declaration and give effect to
each, Appellants argument altogether ignores this provision.

[See Brief of the

Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 18 (citing Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62
(Utah 1981)).] Whether the Declaration permits or forbids the Menu-Board Signs thus
resolves to whether such signs are properly considered to be "pylon, monument or other freestanding sign[s]," or "directional signs."
The Menu-Board Signs are not "pylon, monument or other free-standing sign[s]."
"Under the well-established Rile of construction ejusdem generis, general language must be
confined to its meaning by specific enumeration which proceeds it, unless a contrary
intention is shown." Swenson v. Erickson, 2000 UT 16, If 16, 998 P.2d 807 (citations
omitted). Thus, "in the phrase horses, cattle, sheep, pigs, goats, or any other barnyard
animal, the general language or any other barnyard animal - despite its seeming breadth would probably be held as applying only to four-legged, hoofed mammals (and thus would
exclude chickens)." Black's Law Dictionary, 218 (New Pocketed. 1996). In this case, under
the ejusdem generis canon of construction, the general term, "other free-standing sign,"
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includes only signs similar to pylon or monument signs. The Menu-Board Signs are similar
to neither.
According to the dictionary, a pylon is a "tall structure erected as a support . . . ."
Oxford Desk Dictionary and Thesaurus, 648 (American ed. 1997). A monument is defined
as "anything enduring that serves to commemorate or make celebrated . . . ." Id., at 513.
While these terms perfectly describe the tall, billboard-type, attention-getting "Wendy's" sign
to the south of the Wendy's Property along 3300 South, they do not describe the much
shorter, smaller and less visible Menu-Board Signs. [R. at 209 (photograph taken from
northeast of the Wendy's Property looking southwest depicting the "Wendy's" pylon sign
and the Menu-Board Signs).]
The Menu-Board Signs are properly considered "directional signs," which the
Declaration expressly permits. Indeed, like all menu-board signs, the Menu-Board Signs
indicate the direction traffic should travel through the Drive-Through Facilities and provide
directions about the products Wendy's' customers can order and the manner in which orders
are to be placed. [R. at 209.] Since the Declaration expressly permits an unlimited number
of such signs, the trial court's determination that "Wendy's is entitled to a declaratory
judgment decreeing that the Menu Board Signs may remain in use in their present location
and configuration" was appropriate and should be affirmed. [R. at 381.]
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B.

Menu-Board Signs are Implicitly Permitted by the Declaration.

Because the Declaration expressly permits the maintenance of a drive-through
restaurant on the Wendy's Property, the same document cannot reasonably be interpreted to
forbid the maintenance of all necessary and normal incidents of such a restaurant. [R. at 38.]
The trial court correctly found that the Menu-Board Signs are "essential to the operation of
drive through restaurants" like the restaurant maintained on the Wendy's Property. [R. at
378.] This fact was undisputed below. [R. at 123, 260-61.] It is also undisputed that the
Declaration permits the operation of a drive-through restaurant on the Wendy's Property. [R.
at 38.] Construing the Declaration as Appellants urge to permit a drive-through restaurant
on the one hand, but forbid the very apparatus necessary to the operation of the restaurant on
the other, would make the Declaration internally inconsistent and produce a perverse result.
The Court should, therefore, reject Appellants' interpretation of the Declaration and affirm
the trial court's Final Judgment.
III.

WENDY'S USE OF THE DRIVE-THROUGH FACILITIES IS NOT A
TRESPASS

For the reasons set forth above in Section I hereof, Wendy's maintenance and use of
the Drive-Through Facilities in their present location and configuration is expressly permitted
and authorized by the Declaration. Wendy's is, therefore, not a trespasser and has not
breached the Declaration. Consequently, whether the statutes of limitation have run with
respect to Appellants' trespass and breach of contract claims is immaterial and the Court
need not consider Appellants' argument on those topics.
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[See Brief of the

Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 21 -25 (contending that Wendy's persistent use of the Drive-Through
Facilities constitutes a continuing trespass on which the statute of limitation has yet to run).]
Should the Court nonetheless reach Appellants' statutes of limitation argument, the
trial court correctly held that the limitations periods applicable to Appellants' trespass and
breach of contract claims expired many years before Appellants commenced this action. [R.
at 379-80.] Appellants' trespass and breach of contract claims are both based on the same
pair of circumstances, namely the physical location of the Drive-Through Facilities and
Wendy's continuing use of the Drive-Through Facilities.2

[R. at 80-81.] As noted

previously, the physical location of the Drive-Through Facilities and the Menu-Board Signs
is expressly permitted by the Declaration and, therefore, cannot constitute either a trespass
or a breach of contract.3 Moreover, as the trial court correctly found, the Drive-Through
Facilities are "considerably more permanent" than the pile of dirt at issue in Breiggar
Properties, L.C. v. H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc., 2002 UT 53, If 11, 52 P.3d 1133. [R. at 379.]

2

Appellants make repeated reference to a "new fence" supposedly installed by
Wendy's on or about the Drive-Through Facilities. [See Brief of the Plaintiffs/Appellants,
at 23-24.] There is no evidence in the record, however, to support Appellants' claim that
Wendy's installed any fence on or about the Wendy's Property. While some fencing is
evident in one or more of the photographs attached to the affidavit of Steven J. Marshall,
none of Appellants' affiants mentioned a new fence. [R. at 286-88.]
3

In the event the Court determines that the Menu-Board Signs are not permitted by the
Declaration, Appellants' causes of action for trespass and breach of contract may not be timebarred with respect only to Wendy's erection of menu-board signs on the Wendy's Property.
Appellants' claims with respect to the Drive-Through Facilities, however, would still be
untimely as they were not asserted until long after the Drive-Through Facilities were
constructed.
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With respect to Wendy's continuing use of the Drive-Through Facilities, Appellants
allege that Wendy's' employees and patrons persistently traverse the Common Area, and that
Wendy's' agents maintain the landscaping on the traffic island comprising part of the DriveThrough Facilities. [See Brief of the Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 23-24.] Appellants' contention
that these activities constitute trespassing and breaches of contract ignores the indisputable
fact that the Declaration expressly permits travel over and through the Common Area, and
the maintenance of structures within the Common Area.
With respect to vehicular and foot traffic over and about the Common Area, the
Declaration provides that
Common Area shall be used only for vehicular access, circulation and parking,
pedestrian traffic and the comfort and convenience of the Owners (i.e., the
owners of the property to which the Declaration pertains), tenants, customers,
invitees, licensees, agents and employees of the Owners and business
occupants of the buildings constructed in the Shopping Center.
[R. at 32.] The Declaration further provides that
Each Owner, as grantor with respect to each parcel owned by such Owner,
hereby grants to each of the other Owners, as grantees, for the benefit of each
of such other Owners and their respective tenants, employees, agents,
customers and invitees of such tenants, and for the benefit of each parcel
owned by such grantee, a non-exclusive easement appurtenant to each parcel
owned by each grantee for ingress and egress by vehicular and pedestrian
traffic and for vehicular parking upon, over and across the Common Area
within each parcel or parcels owned by the grantor.
[R. at 34-35.] Thus, vehicular and pedestrian use of the Common Area by Wendy's'
employees and patrons is not prohibited by the Declaration, but is expressly authorized.
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Appellants' objection to Wendy's' periodic maintenance of the Drive-Through
Facilities by mowing and landscaping is unjustified and peculiar for a number of reasons.
First, as the owners of the Shopping Center, Appellants could reasonably be expected to
desire activities tending to enhance the appearance of the Common Area and its
surroundings. Assuming Appellants have such a desire, Wendy's' maintenance activities
over the years have benefitted Appellants, not harmed them.4 Second, Wendy's' periodic
occupation of the Drive-Through Facilities for purposes of maintaining the landscaping
thereon, among other things, is not only permitted by the Declaration, but required. Indeed,
in relevant part, the Declaration states that "[e]ach owner, at its own expense, shall maintain
the area designated as Common Area Only on the Plot Plan and located on its parcel at all
times in good and clean condition and repair . . . ." [R. at 36-37.] Consequently, to the
extent that Wendy's' employees and agents have occupied or traversed the Drive-Through
Facilities for purposes of maintaining the same, their doing so was in performance of a duty
imposed by the Declaration. That performance was neither a trespass nor a breach of the
Declaration.

4

To the extent that Appellants really do object to Wendy's' mowing, watering and
landscaping the Drive-Through Facilities, Wendy's would not object to Appellants' assuming
the responsibility for such activities in the future.
191462vl -MJB

21

IV.

WENDY'S IS ENTITLED TO A PERMANENT INJUNCTION
AGAINST APPELLANTS' INTERFERENCE WITH THE DRIVETHROUGH FACILITIES

The trial court properly enjoined Appellants' interference with Wendy's' use and
maintenance of the Drive-Through Facilities and Menu-Board Signs. Appellants are not
entitled to remove such improvements under any of the theories they advance.
A.

: The Court Should Affirm the Trial Court's injunction.

At Wendy's' request, the trial court permanently enjoined Appellants from interfering
with Wendy's use and maintenance of the Drive-Through Facilities and the Menu-Board
Signs. [R. at 385.] This injunction is entirely appropriate in light of the fact that the
Declaration expressly permits the Drive-Through Facilities and Menu-Board Signs in their
present location and configuration. Moreover, the Declaration provides for injunctive relief
"[i]n the event of any violation or threatened violation of any provision in [the] Declaration
. . . ." [R. at 16-17.] This Court should, therefore, affirm the trial court's Final Judgment.
Appellants assail the trial court's injunction by claiming, in the first place, that the
trial court's Conclusions of Law and Final Judgment are "internally inconsistent." [See Brief
of the Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 25-26.] This is so, Appellants claim, because having
determined the Drive-Through Facilities to be a an act of trespass, the trial court went on to
forbid their removal from the Shopping Center. [Id.] The flaw in Appellants' argument is,
of course, that the trial court did not find or hold that the Drive-Through Facilities amount
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to a trespass. To the contrary, the trial court held that the Drive-Through Facilities and
Menu-Board Signs are expressly authorized by the Declaration. [R. at 379-81.]
Appellants argument is based on a single phrase of the trial court's Conclusions of
Law, which is taken out of context and twisted. Although the trial court stated in part that
"the alleged trespass is permanent and has been so since 1982," it is readily apparent that,
when read in context, the trial court meant only that even if the Drive-Through Facilities and
Menu-Board Signs did constitute a trespass, the statutes of limitation with respect to actions
thereon expired long ago. [R. at 379-81.] Again, in no sense did the trial court find or hold
that the Drive-Through Facilities and Menu-Board Signs constitute a trespass. The trial
court's enjoining Appellants' interference with the Drive-Through Facilities and MenuBoard Signs was thus justified and should be affirmed.
B.

Appellants are Not Entitled to Remove the Drive-Through
Facilities or the Menu-Board Signs,

Appellants go on to contend that they are entitled to remove the Drive-Through
Facilities and Menu-Board Signs. [See Brief of the Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 26-28.] This is
so, Appellants say, because Wendy's cannot maintain permanent improvements pursuant to
a prescriptive easement and because no property right to any of the Common Area vested in
Wendy's merely by the running of the statutes of limitation applicable to Appellants' claims.

ud.]
Wendy's has never claimed the right to locate the Drive-Through Facilities or MenuBoard Signs pursuant to a prescriptive easement over the Shopping Center.
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Rather,

Wendy's' counterclaim for recognition of a prescriptive easement was intended only to
secure the right of Wendy's' patrons, employees and agents to traverse the Common Area
and the Wendy's Property to make use of and maintain the restaurant thereon. [R. at 22.]
Wendy's did not seek recognition of an easement with respect to the Drive-Through
Facilities and Menu-Board Signs themselves because, as explained previously, the
Declaration expressly permits those improvements to be where they are located. A
prescriptive easement is unnecessary because the Declaration grants an express easement.
Likewise, Wendy's does not claim to have acquired any manner of ownership interest
in the Shopping Center by virtue of the running of the statutes of limitation applicable to
Appellants' claims. The acquisition of such an interest is entirely unnecessary because the
Drive-Through Facilities and Menu-Board Signs are permitted by the plain language of the
Declaration and the express easements granted thereby. Appellants are not, therefore, at
liberty to interfere with or remove either the Drive-Through Facilities or the Menu-Board
Signs.
V.

THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS5 FEES

The trial court properly ordered Appellants to pay Wendy's' costs and attorneys' fees
in this action based on the plain language of the Declaration. In relevant part, the Declaration
states that
In the event that legal proceedings are brought or commenced to enforce any
of the terms of this Declaration against any Owner or other party with an
interest in the Shopping Center, the successful party in such action shall then
191462vl-MJB
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be entitled to receive and shall receive from the defaulting Owner or party a
reasonable sum as attorneys' fee and costs, to be fixed by the court in the same
action.
[R. at 47.] As the prevailing party below, Wendy's was entitled to an award of costs and
attorneys' fees, and the trial court's grant of such an award should be affirmed. In addition,
the trial court's award should be augmented by the amount of Wendy's' attorneys' fees on
appeal. See Edwards' Pet Supply v. Bentley, 652 P.2d 889, 890 (Utah 1982) (approving
augmentation of trial court's attorneys' fee award for fees incurred on appeal). This Court
should thus remand this action to the trial court for a determination of that amount. Id.
Appellants suggest that the trial court erred in awarding Wendy's its costs and
attorneys' fees for two reasons. First, Appellants argue that under the Declaration, attorneys'
fees and costs can only be recovered from a "defaulting owner or party." [See Brief of the
Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 29.] Since Appellants are not in default of their obligations under
the Declaration, so their argument goes, they cannot be ordered to pay Wendy's' costs and
attorneys' fees. [Id.] Second, Appellants contend that Wendy's' failure to allocate its
attorneys' fees among the separate claims at issue precludes an award of fees and costs.
Appellants are wrong in both cases, and the Court should affirm the trial court's award.
A,

The Trial Court's Construction and Application
Declaration's Attorneys' Fee Provision was Correct.

of the

Appellants' argument that, because they did not breach the Declaration, they cannot
be liable for Wendy's' attorneys' fees and costs, is raised for the first time on appeal and
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consequently must be rejected. Even if the Court were to consider Appellants' argument,
however, the argument fails because Appellants are, in fact, in default of the Declaration.
1.

Appellants Waived Their Textual Argument by Failing to Raise
it Below.

It is well-settled in Utah that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be
considered. See 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72,ffl[50-51, 99 P.3d 801
(quoting Brookside Mobile Home Park Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, If 14, 48 P.3d 968).
Appellants' suggestion that the language of the Declaration's attorneys' fee provision
precludes an award in Wendy's' favor is raised for the first time before this Court. As such,
Appellants' argument must be disregarded.
In their Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and
Affidavit and Award of Attorneys' Fees, Appellants argued that the trial court's award of
attorneys' fees in Wendy's' favor was improper for only two reasons. First, Appellants
suggested that inasmuch as the trial court determined that their claims were barred by the
applicable statutes of limitation, the trial court had not rendered a decision on the merits and
an award of attorneys' fees was, therefore, inappropriate. [R. at 355.] Second, Appellants
argued, as they have on appeal, that Wendy's' failure to allocate its attorneys' fees between
compensable and non-compensable claims precluded an award. [Id.] Appellants did not
argue or suggest that an award of attorneys' fees was otherwise improper. Certainly,
Appellants never contended that an award was inappropriate because they were not a
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"defaulting owner or party." Having failed to raise this argument below, Appellants may not
raise it on appeal.
2.

Appellants Are in Default of the Declaration.

Appellants' contention that they are not a "defaulting owner or party" within the
meaning of the Declaration is wrong. [See Brief of the Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 29.] Implicit
in the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Final Judgment is the correct
determination that Appellants' bringing suit against Wendy's to collect damages for the
existence of, and to eliminate the presence of, improvements that are expressly permitted by
the Declaration and that have remained in place, unchallenged, for more than two decades
constituted a breach or "default" of the Declaration. [R. at 375-87.] While Appellants'
conduct may not fall within a strict, legalistic definition of the word "default," the term is
certainly susceptible to an interpretation that would encompass the assertion of baseless,
untimely claims. For this reason, the trial court's Final Judgment should be affirmed.
B.

Wendy's Was Not Required to Allocate its Attorneys' Fees Among
Claims.

Wendy's was not, as Appellants state, required to "allocate the fees it [requested]
among the separate causes of action or claims pursued in the litigation." [Brief of the
Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 29.] The case Appellants cite as the basis for their argument, Brown
v. DavidK. Richards & Co., 1999 UT App 109,978 P.2d 470, does not say what Appellants
claim it says. Rather than requiring an attorneys' fee claimant to allocate such fees among
"the separate causes of action or claims pursued," Brown actually requires an allocation of
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attorneys' fees between "compensable and non-compensable claims." Brown, 1999UTApp
109, H 15 (citing Cottonwood Mall Co, v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 1992)). Where,
as here, there are no "non-compensable claims," or "where the proof of a compensable claim
and otherwise non-compensable claim are closely related and require proof of the same
facts," no allocation is either possible or necessary. Brown, 1999 UT App 109, f 20 (citing
First General Servs. v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480, 486 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)).
As noted, no non-compensable claims were either asserted or litigated in this case.
All three of the causes of action asserted in Appellants' Amended Complaint were based on
the Declaration. [R. at 363-64.] Appellants' first cause of action alleged trespass based on
Wendy's' allegedly improper occupation of the Common Area as that term is defined by the
Declaration. [R. at 81.] Second, Appellants alleged a breach of the Declaration by virtue of
Wendy's' maintenance of the Drive-Through Facilities, and finally Appellants claimed that
the Menu-Board Signs violated the Declaration. [R. at 81-82.] Since all three of Appellants'
claims were based on the Declaration, and Wendy's prevailed with respect to each of those
claims, there were no non-compensable claims to which Wendy's could or should have
allocated any portion of its attorneys' fees and costs. There was, therefore, no need for the
trial court to force Wendy's to allocate its attorneys' fees and costs.
To the extent that Appellants' contend that any of the relief afforded by the trial court
was not based on the Declaration, and was consequently not "compensable," Appellants are
mistaken. [See brief of the Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 29 (opining that Wendy's' award of
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attorneys' fees was "especially troubling" because the trial court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law were broader than its Minute Entry granting Wendy's' motion for
summary judgment).] In fact, all of the relief provided by the trial court's Final Judgment
was rooted in the Declaration. [R. at 384-87.] Specifically, the trial court determined that:
(1) the Drive-Through Facilities and Menu-Board Signs are permitted by the Declaration and
may remain in place; (2) Appellants are enjoined from interfering with Wendy's' use and
maintenance of the Drive-Through Facilities and Menu-Board Signs; and (3) Wendy's is
entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs. [Id.] As noted previously herein, the
Declaration expressly provides for both injunctive relief and attorneys' fee awards. [R. at
45-47.] There is thus no merit to Appellants' contention that any portion of the trial court's
award of attorneys' fees and costs in Wendy's' favor was for non-compensable claims. This
Court should, therefore, affirm the trial court's award.
CONCLUSION
The Court should affirm the trial court's Final Judgment for all of the foregoing
reasons. In addition, the Court should remand this action to the trial court for a determination
of the attorneys' fees incurred by Wendy's in connection with this appeal with instructions
to augment the trial court's prior award of attorneys' fees by such amount.
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